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TO TELL THE TRUTH: THE PROBLEM
OF PROSECUTORIAL "MANIPULATION"
OF SENTENCING FACTS
Frank 0. Bowman, III*
In January of this year, Francesca Bowman, Chair
of Probation Officers Advisory Group, sent a letter to
Judge Richard P. Conaboy, Chairman of the Sentenc-
ing Commission, summarizing the results of a survey
sent to probation officers in eighty-five districts.1 It
expresses the concern that, in the view of some
probation officers, the government "usually" is
cooperative in supplying information to probation
officers preparing presentence investigation reports,
but that there appear to be exceptions "when the
government wants to protect a plea agreement."2
I will leave discussion of the methodological
merits or demerits of the survey to others. Suffice it
to say that I doubt even the survey's authors would
hold it out as containing reliable quantitative data on
the frequency with which prosecutors withhold from
probation officers information relevant to sentencing,
or as embodying reliable quantitative information on
the frequency with which probation officers think
such information is being withheld. Nonetheless, the
survey raises once again the spectre of prosecutorial
"manipulation" of the guidelines. It is to that general
question, rather than to the specifics of the survey,
that the balance of these remarks is directed.
I. Assessing "Manipulation"
A. The Critical Perspective
I have no doubt that Francesca Bowman's letter
will be greeted among guideline critics as confirma-
tion of an article of faith-namely that the guidelines
scheme represents a dramatic transfer of sentencing
discretion from judges to prosecutors. The claim that
prosecutors in pursuit of plea agreements commonly
manipulate or selectively withhold facts from the
sentencing court is essential to the critics' creed
because, if it turns out that prosecutors do not
manipulate facts, if they honestly present to the
sentencing court all the information at their disposal,
then the "power" prosecutors exercise over sentenc-
ing outcomes derives primarily from the circum-
stance that prosecutors have greater access to facts
than the other participants in the fact-driven guide-
lines system. It is only if prosecutors can be shown to
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influence outcomes by suppressing information that
they can convincingly be portrayed as having
inherited from a supposedly disenfranchised bench
any dramatically increased degree of "discretion."
(There is, of course, no doubt that prosecutorial
charging decisions also influence sentencing outcomes.
But the existence of such discretion does not vitiate
the general point that most claims of absolute
prosecutorial domination of the guidelines system
rest on the claim that prosecutors produce or with-
hold sentencing facts at will to produce desired
outcomes. Moreover, given that so many guideline
battles are fought over drug sentences, it bears
emphasis that the real points of contention are
typically the quantity-driven minimum sentences
prescribed by either statute or guideline. In those
cases, the sentence is based largely on drug quantity,
a fact known to the prosecutor and critical to sentenc-
ing, but not directly relevant to the charging decision.
A similar situation exists in fraud cases where the
primary sentence determinant is not the crime of
conviction, but the amount of the "loss"-a fact
determined at sentencing.)
There is, of course, considerable irony suffusing
the ongoing argument about prosecutorial "manipu-
lation" of the guidelines. It stems from the fact that
prosecutorial "manipulation," to the degree it occurs,
involves the withholding of inculpatory evidence,
which if presented would increase a defendant's
sentence. No critic to my knowledge has ever alleged
that federal prosecutors make a practice of withhold-
ing exculpatory or mitigating evidence from the
sentencing court.3 Therefore, the argument is that
prosecutors are illegitimately exercising a power to
produce lower sentences than the facts of the case,
vigorously presented, would require. This is a
contention which fits oddly in the mouths of those
who commonly make it-commentators whose
fundamental view of the guidelines is that sentencing
levels are too high and that there is too little room for
discretionary mitigation of punishment. The real
position of such critics is not that prosecutors should
not have the discretion to mitigate punishment, but
that other actors, primarily judges, should have such
discretion as well.
Nonetheless, despite the motivations of the
critics, the criticism of prosecutorial manipulation is
not an insubstantial one. If prosecutors do indeed
routinely and selectively withhold evidence to
achieve desired sentencing outcomes, then the pre-
guidelines regime of unfettered judicial sentencing
discretion will in fact have been replaced by nearly
untrammeled prosecutorial control.
B. The Absence of Data
The somewhat troubling truth is that no one
really knows how often prosecutors "manipulate" the
guidelines, either by agreeing with defense counsel to
keep facts away from the probation office and the
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judge or by other potentially available means. The
probation officer survey tells us no more than that
some probation officers think some Assistant U.S.
Attorneys sometimes do not reveal information that
might endanger a plea.
The academic literature to date is likewise of little
help. In 1992, Professor Schulhofer estimated that
guidelines manipulation by the parties occurs "in
twenty to thirty-five percent of all guilty plea cases."4
This figure is often quoted, primarily because it is the
only numerical estimate in existence. 5 But
Schulhofer's estimate is a tenuous cornerstone on
which to build much of an edifice.
In the first place, the 20-35% figure is not an
estimate of the prevalence of so-called "fact bargain-
ing," but appears to lump together the author's
estimates of the incidence of various techniques of
circumventing a strict application of the guidelines,
such as charging offenses with low statutory maxi-
mums and recommending substantial assistance
departures for defendants whose assistance was not
in truth very useful.' Schulhofer says of pure fact
manipulation that, "My own sense... [is that] there
are few cases, perhaps five percent of the total, in which
relevant facts are hidden from probation."7
Second, although in fairness it is difficult to know
how they could be improved upon, the best that can
be said of Professor Schulhofer's estimates is that they
are subjective and imprecise. They are based on
Schulhofer's personal interpretation of a series of
interviews with Assistant U.S. Attorneys as part of a
study of plea bargaining he did with then-Sentencing
Commissioner Ilene Nagel.8 Indeed, Schulhofer
himself is so uncertain of the accuracy of his 20-35%
number that he said of it:
This figure is a rough estimate and reflects a
national average; the data makes clear that
guideline manipulation varies widely among
districts. Unfortunately, I cannot begin, in this space,
to defend the accuracy of this estimate. Those with
different intuitions are entitled to retain their own view
until a detailed analysis can be presented.9
So far as I can determine, no further "detailed
analysis" of the Nagel-Schulhofer data on this
particular point has ever been published.10
Perhaps the most important point about the
Schulhofer estimates is that they suggest that manipu-
lation is not a rampant problem. If the estimates are
reasonably accurate, the probation office receives
complete information 95% of the time, and there is no
attempt of any sort to manipulate the guidelines in 65
to 80% of the cases. That is not an inconsiderable
success rate."
II. Addressing the Prosecutor's Role
Even if manipulation is not, at present, a signifi-
cant problem, the probation department survey
should nonetheless set off some alarm bells. I recently
completed an eight-month stint as Special Counsel to
the Sentencing Commission on detail from the U.S.
Attorney's Office in Miami. As part of that assign-
ment, I was privileged to participate in discussions in
and around the Sentencing Commission and with
participants in the Department of Justice policy-
making process concerning the guidelines. The
probation officers survey has been the subject of a
number of those discussions. Without revealing any
confidences, it is plain from the disparate reactions of
experienced Justice Department lawyers that there
exists a wide spectrum of opinion about what Depart-
ment policy is on the appropriate limits of plea bar-
gaining under the guidelines, and what it ought to be.
The one point on which there is universal
agreement is that a federal prosecutor may not
affirmatively misrepresent facts to the court.
12
Beyond that rudimentary principle, however, there is
little consensus. Based on my conversations with
various U.S. Attorneys and experienced AUSAs,
there is no dissent from the general policy expressed
in the Principles of Federal Prosecution, and rein-
forced by Attorney General Reno in her 1993 Memo-
randum, 3 that prosecutors are to provide all re-
quested information to the probation officer when-
ever possible so that an accurate and complete
presentence report can be prepared. 4
This apparent unanimity actually comes loaded
with a series of caveats. It is not clear that all
prosecutors feel bound to turn over material for
which they are not asked where such material might
defeat a plea agreement. Likewise, the "whenever
possible" reservation might, under certain circum-
stances, permit a real, or perhaps conveniently
inflated, concern for the security of sources or
ongoing investigations to raise an obstacle to
disclosure of inculpatory information inconsistent
with a plea arrangement.
One point frequently raised by experienced
prosecutors seems to rest on confusion about the
interaction between Department policy on plea
agreements and the obligations of prosecutors to the
court. I have several times heard prosecutors whose
judgment I respect opine that there is no obligation to
turn over to the probation service material concern-
ing conduct or offenses which are "not readily
provable." The obvious point of reference is the DOJ
charge and plea bargaining policy that prosecutors
must charge "the most serious offense that is consis-
tent with the nature of the defendant's conduct, and
that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction," 5
and that prosecutors may not accept a plea to less
than one count of the most serious readily provable
offense.16
But merely because prosecutors may agree to
charge or plea bargains involving admissions to less
than all of the criminal conduct in which a defendant
engaged does not relieve them of the obligation to
disclose to the court through the probation depart-
ment all information relevant to sentencing. A
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criminal act or a relevant sentencing factor may not
be "readily provable" beyond a reasonable doubt at trial,
but there may be ample proof to satisfy the prepon-
derance standard of sentencing proceedings.17 It is, at
a minimum, inconsistent for prosecutors to take
advantage of the reduced burden of proof at sentenc-
ing to enhance penalties when that result suits their
purposes, and then to claim piously that they are
entitled to withhold from the court the same type of
information to ensure mitigation of punishment when
that is thought desirable. I hasten to add that
prosecutors need not, and in my view should not,
turn over to the probation officer every potentially
damaging rumor about a defendant's life and habits.
The point is that, based on the burdens of proof
considered applicable at sentencing, the quantum of
certainty which constitutes the dividing line between
what should and need not be disclosed is based on a
preponderance rather than a reasonable doubt
standard.
Beyond disputes over particular exceptions to the
general policy of full disclosure, there is plainly
continuing uncertainty about the general effect of the
Reno Memo.18 There are those who view it as no
more than a restatement of the preexisting
Thornburgh policy of dutiful adherence to guidelines
principles couched in a slightly softer tone. Others
apparently feel that it represents a major policy shift,
particularly insofar as it invites explicit consideration
of "the extent to which particular charges fit the
specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with
the purposes of the federal criminal code, and
maximize the impact of federal resources on crime."
This phrasing can be read as an invitation to in-
creased reliance on charge bargaining and as implicit
legitimation of otherwise unjustifiable case disposi-
tions premised on considerations of administrative
efficiency and convenience.
My own impression is that there is very little
impetus within the Department hierarchy to dispel
the current uncertainty about what the Reno Memo
means for prosecutors. One suspects that the
prevailing view is that a bit of ambiguity is not
altogether a bad thing - it soothes external critics
and obviates the need for resolving potentially
disruptive internal disagreements. There is nonethe-
less danger to the sentencing guidelines scheme in
general, as well as to the Justice Department's narrow
self-interest in a policy that fosters uncertainty among
line prosecutors and their supervisors about their
obligations under the guidelines, or encourages them
to believe that they are free to make any bargain
which suits their personal sense of justice or local
administrative convenience.
III. To Prosecutors: A Call for Disciplined
Stewardship
On balance, the guidelines are a boon to prosecu-
tors, albeit not for the conventionally expressed
reason that they bestow unlimited discretionary
power on the government. The guidelines are good
for prosecutors because they ensure that facts have
necessary consequences. Where once no amount of
proof of any fact could reliably produce a particular
sentence, prosecutors can now do what they do best-
present evidence-in the confidence that proven facts
will generate predictable results. The price to be paid
for the power to influence sentencing outcomes is a
surrender of some degree of discretion.
Prosecutors should not forget that the sentencing
guidelines arose from long discontent with a prior
regime in which both judges and prosecutors were
felt, by the general public at least, to collude in the
plea bargaining bazaar that produced disparate and
unjust outcomes. Moreover, when the Sentencing
Commission drafted the guidelines, it created the
relevant conduct provisions primarily to ensure that
the discretion withdrawn from judges was not merely
transferred to prosecutors. 9 To a large extent, the
efficacy of the restraint embodied in the relevant
conduct concept, as well as the overall integrity of the
guidelines process, rests not on any coercive mecha-
nism, but on the conviction that prosecutors will act
as faithful stewards, pursuing cases with vigor,
advising the court of relevant facts with candor, and
letting the sentencing chips fall where the guidelines
say they must.
On balance, I am confident that prosecutors have
played the role envisioned for them reasonably well.'
Nonetheless, if either through inattention or a policy
of studied ambiguity the Department were to foster
an institutional culture in which overt prosecutorial
manipulation of the guidelines flourished, it is not
improbable that Congress, the Commission or both
would seek to impose controls on prosecutorial
charging and plea bargaining discretion. Such a result
would be deeply unfortunate, and not only from the
parochial perspective of the Department of Justice.
The guidelines are a tightly jointed system.
Unlike many guideline critics, I view this as one of the
system's notable advantages. Nonetheless, all human
systems need some play in the joints, some room for
the operation of discretion and intuitive recognition of
exceptions to general rules. One of the lubricants of
the guidelines mechanism is the sensible, honest
exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Still, the key to
prosecutors retaining discretionary power, and the
key to the long term health of the guideline enter-
prise, is the recognition that guidelines are the
outcome of a democratic judgment, a judgment to
which prosecutors, like federal judges, are duty-
bound to submit.
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